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TWO-DIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION 
Michael Aaron Granne* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The federal government has several explicit grants of foreign affairs 
powers in the Constitution.1  States enjoy all powers not delegated to the 
federal government by the United States Constitution.  As the states 
continue to intertwine themselves in the web of globalization, they seek 
to act in ever-larger marketplaces. The web of commerce, the 
environment, migration, and immigration are ready examples of areas of 
the law and policy that do not respect state or national boundaries.  In all 
of these areas and countless others, however, state actions will butt up 
against the federal government’s largely unfettered power to act in the 
foreign affairs sphere.  How and to what extent these state actions may 
interfere with federal programs and interests in foreign affairs and 
diplomacy, or to what extent those exercises of the federal foreign affairs 
power preempt state actions, are questions that have vexed courts and 
commentators alike. 
Should, for example, a state be able to lengthen its statute of 
limitations to remedy alleged wrongs done to a group of Mexican 
migrant workers?  Would it matter if their presence in the United States 
was the result of and governed by agreements between the United States 
federal government and Mexico?2  Can a state lengthen a statute of 
limitations to provide a longer period in which to sue on life insurance 
policies related to the Armenian Genocide?3  If there is some limitation 
on the state government’s ability to change its own laws in such a 
manner because of a federal interest, must the federal government 
explicitly express that interest and/or its preemptive power?  Or can that 
prohibition be implied from other federal actions? 
The courts have struggled to provide a coherent framework for 
analyzing these questions.  Scholars have quite correctly criticized the 
                                                 
∗ Visiting Assistant Professor, Hofstra Law School.  I would like to thank Thomas 
Healy, Kristen Boon, Edward Hartnett, Molly Land, Jacob Cogan, the Junior International 
Law Scholars Association, and the participants in the International Law in the Domestic 
Context Conference for valuable assistance with this essay. 
1 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulating foreign commerce); U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 4 (providing for naturalization of aliens); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (punishing 
violations of the law of nations); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–13 (declaring war and 
providing for the army and navy); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (requiring the President serve as 
commander-in-chief and signing and negotiating treaties). 
2 See Cruz v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
3 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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courts’ failures to provide rational doctrinal support even for those 
incoherent frameworks that have been developed.  Those critiques have 
largely been of two types:  (1) historical and originalist analyses, both 
strict and lenient, on the use of federal foreign affairs prerogatives to 
preempt otherwise valid state actions4 and (2) functionalist accounts of 
the relative merits of the federal and state interests at issue.5 
This essay follows yet another course.  This essay argues that there 
are principled distinctions to be made among state actions that encroach 
on the federal government’s foreign affairs sphere.  Following the recent 
trend in scholarship to understand federalism in its so-called two 
dimensions, this essay examines the extent to which federal interests in 
uniformity, “vertical” federalism, and structural interests in coordination 
among states, “horizontal” federalism, inform the proper understanding 
and application of foreign affairs preemption.  Analyzing foreign affairs 
preemption cases through this lens results in a tripartite typology that, 
this essay concludes, addresses and respects the federal and state 
interests at stake.  This typology provides some order to the chaos that 
encompasses foreign affairs preemption cases. 
Under this typology, a state’s action may fall into one of the 
following three categories:  (1) actions that implicate both the federal 
government’s uniformity interest and the sister states’ coordination 
interests and, therefore, lie outside the states’ constitutional power to 
effect; (2) actions that interfere only with the federal government’s 
uniform position in foreign affairs and, therefore, will be displaced if 
they present an obstacle to a pre-existing federal policy; and (3) the 
remaining default where neither uniformity nor coordination is a 
concern and where only a specific conflict with a federal action will 
preempt the state’s authority to act. 
II.  THE PARADIGMS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION 
The constitutional framework for foreign affairs preemption is 
murky; the constitution has famously been called a “strange, laconic 
document”6 regarding the distribution of the foreign affairs powers.  
While there are notable dissenters, there is broad agreement that the 
federal government possesses the lion’s share of the foreign affairs 
powers.  Congress is granted, for example, the powers to declare war, 
regulate foreign commerce, punish offenses to the law of nations, and 
                                                 
4 See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs:  The Original 
Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 403–29 (1999). 
5 See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175. 
6 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 13 (2d ed. 1996). 
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establish and support an Army and Navy.  The Executive is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and has the power to make 
treaties and appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.  Some argue that the President has residual foreign affairs 
powers under the Take Care and Vesting Clauses.7  Moreover, there are 
explicit limitations on the role of the states in foreign affairs; their 
inability to declare war, maintain armies, enter into treaties, compacts, or 
agreements with foreign nations without congressional approval, and 
the limitations on their powers to tax imports and exports.  Taken 
together with the history of the union under the Articles of 
Confederation, the generally accepted conclusion is that the federal 
government holds the majority (if not the totality) of the power to act in 
the international arena. 
There is broader dispute, however, about the extent to which the 
existence of, or a federal action under, those powers displaces state law.  
The Supreme Court has varying approaches to preemption.  The Court 
has been careless with its language and rhetoric, its constitutional and 
policy justifications, and its overall analysis.  Indeed, statements from 
two of the most recent foreign affairs cases are almost completely 
contradictory.8  Foreign affairs preemption is built on the idea that there 
is a realm of foreign affairs that is simply outside the states’ competence.  
What has never been made clear, though, is the extent to which federal 
government action must divest the state of power by explicit action; 
indeed, the Court expressly noted that the amount of federal action may 
vary depending on the type of state action at issue.9 
                                                 
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . .”); 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”).  The Take Care and Vesting Clauses are more commonly used in 
arguments supporting an expansive conception of Executive, as opposed to Legislative, 
control over foreign affairs.  Nevertheless, they are relevant to federalism questions 
regarding the distribution of foreign affairs powers, not only those involving separation of 
powers. 
8 Compare Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008) (“The Executive’s narrow and 
strictly limited authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive 
agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum.”), 
with Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“Although the source of the 
President’s power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical 
gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the 
President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’”). 
9 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.11. 
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A. Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption 
The broadest assertion of the federal foreign affairs power’s ability to 
displace state law is Zschernig v. Miller.10  In Zschernig, the Court 
invalidated an Oregon inheritance statute that required any real or 
personal property willed to a non-resident alien to escheat to the state 
unless the alien’s home country granted reciprocal rights of inheritance 
for Oregon legatees.  Despite previously upholding a facial challenge to a 
similar statute in Clark v. Allen,11 the Court found various problems with 
the statute in Zschernig, as applied by the courts of Oregon and other 
states with similar statutes.12 
The Court began Zschernig with the uncontroversial statement that 
state courts are routinely called upon to interpret foreign law and that 
such interpretation poses no constitutional problem.  However, the 
courts had been improperly using the reciprocity statute as a soapbox to 
proclaim their cold war opinions.13  Indeed, various state courts had 
conducted detailed investigations into foreign nations, including their 
governmental structures, their administration of laws, the enforceability 
of the rights of aliens generally, and whether these rights are “mere[] 
dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of government 
officials.”14  Moreover, state courts rendered opinions regarding whether 
government officials in those nations made credible representations of 
the state of the law or whether those representations were made in bad 
faith, and the courts engaged in other inquiries that would have “more 
than ‘some incidental or indirect effect’” on the conduct of United States 
foreign relations.15  Because of the courts’ application of the statute at 
issue, the Court held that the Oregon statute was an unconstitutional 
interference with the federal government’s foreign relations power, even 
though that power had not been explicitly exercised and the U.S. 
government had asserted that the reciprocity statutes did not unduly 
interfere with its foreign relations activities.16 
The Zschernig approach is often called dormant foreign affairs 
preemption.  Similar to preemption on the basis of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, dormant foreign affairs preemption displaces state 
law without regard to congressional (or executive) action or assertions of 
state interference with federal prerogatives.  State laws are preempted by 
                                                 
10 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
11 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
12 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432–40. 
13 Id. at 435. 
14 Id. at 434. 
15 Id. at 434–35. 
16 Id. at 441. 
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the radiations of authority from the various foreign affairs powers, 
entrusted solely to the federal government, with which they do not 
incidentally interfere.17 
B. Obstacle Preemption 
Another approach that the Court has occasionally followed when 
faced with a foreign affairs challenge to a state statute is to ascertain 
whether the statute in question presents an “obstacle to the 
accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives.”18  The courts make this 
determination by comparing the state action with policies, purposes, and 
general structure of a pre-existing statute (and occasionally an Executive 
Order or Agreement).  If a sufficient obstacle is found, the state law must 
fall.  This doctrine is referred to as obstacle preemption. 
The Court has applied obstacle preemption to foreign affairs 
enactments several times.19  In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,20 
for example, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law barring state 
entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business 
with Burma.  The Court did not reach the question of whether 
Massachusetts had interfered with the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power.  
Instead, the Court reasoned that the Massachusetts statute ran afoul of 
previous congressional mandatory and conditional sanctions against 
Burma. 
The crucial point for the Court was that the state act “undermine[d]” 
the detailed scheme that Congress had devised to sanction Burma and to 
improve its human rights record.21  First, by enacting specific, automatic 
sanctions against Burma, the Massachusetts law constrained the 
discretion that Congress had delegated to the President.22  Second, 
Congress had decided that a certain range of sanctions was appropriate 
and Massachusetts’s approach fell outside that range.23  Finally, 
Congress directed the President to reach out to the international 
community to create a cohesive, multilateral approach in order to get 
Burma to improve its human rights record.  By limiting the President’s 
ability to negotiate with Burma and the rest of the international 
community, the Massachusetts act unduly interfered with congressional 
                                                 
17 See Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 204–05. 
18 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
19 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 60–66 (1941). 
20 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366. 
21 Id. at 373. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 377–79. 
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intent.24  It was an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress,” therefore conflicting with the 
congressional mandate and running afoul of the Supremacy Clause.25 
More controversially, in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 
the Supreme Court invalidated the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act 
(hereinafter “HVIRA”) passed by the State of California, which 
mandated the disclosure of all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 
1945 by any insurance company (or any of its affiliates) doing business in 
California.26  According to the Court, HVIRA unconstitutionally 
interfered with the federal government’s foreign affairs power even 
though the expression of the federal government’s interest came from a 
sole executive agreement that did not explicitly preempt contrary state 
action.27  Indeed, the various executive agreements with France, 
Germany, and Austria implied that the agreements would not prevent 
litigation in state courts.28  Nevertheless, the Court held that state law 
must bow to federal foreign policy and that “generally” the Executive 
has the authority to determine what foreign policy should be.29  In a 
rhetorical flourish, the Court held that “[t]he basic fact is that California 
seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid 
gloves” and such conflict required the state approach to give way.30 
C. Other Options? 
The remaining preemptive approaches—express preemption, 
requiring an explicit statement from Congress to preempt the state law, 
and conflict preemption, requiring preemption if the provisions of the 
two laws directly conflict or if compliance with both is impossible—may 
also be appropriate in certain circumstances.  Crosby noted that express 
statements of congressional intent were not required given the facts of 
that case, but it left open the door to its use in the foreign affairs sphere.  
Moreover, some foreign affairs statutes do contain express preemption 
clauses, perhaps indicating congressional belief that it may be at times 
                                                 
24 Id. at 380–81. 
25 Id. at 373 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
26  539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
27 A “sole executive agreement” is an agreement between the United States and a foreign 
nation(s) executed without the intended or actual participation of the Senate or House of 
Representatives. 
28 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 407–08.  In the executive agreements, the United States agreed 
to submit a statement in any litigation in U.S. courts that the maintenance of any suits 
against French, Austrian, and German companies based on Holocaust-related activities 
would interfere with the foreign policy interests of the United States.  Id. 
29 Id. at 413. 
30 Id. at 428. 
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necessary for Congress to explicitly preempt state interference (or, of 
course, it may be simply an abundance of congressional caution).31  It 
remains to be seen, however, where either of these preemption 
paradigms would be appropriate. 
III.  TWO-DIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM 
This Article presents a framework that courts can use to decide 
which of the competing preemption paradigms should apply to a given 
state action.  Even after the putative demise of the “one voice” 
conception of the federal/state balance,32 under which the Executive had 
to be free to conduct foreign affairs and anything interfering with his or 
her ability to speak as the nation’s “one voice” must fall, none seriously 
contend that the states can speak for the United States in matters of 
foreign policy.  Thus, the question becomes:  when does state action that 
purports to merely legislate actually interfere with the federal 
government’s interest in a uniform expression of foreign policy?  And, in 
the case of peripheral entanglements with the federal government’s 
interest, how explicit must the federal government be to preempt the 
offending state act?  This essay seeks to answer those questions by 
considering how the concepts of horizontal and vertical federalism apply 
to foreign affairs preemption. Recent scholarship has explored the 
difference between these two different types of federalism and 
federalism’s effects.33  Vertical federalism refers to the balance of power 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., War and National Defense Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (2006) (explaining the 
term “preemption” to mean: 
The provisions of this section and the regulations issued pursuant 
thereto shall preempt any law, rule, or regulation of any of the several 
States or the District of Columbia, or any of the territories or 
possessions of the United States, or of any governmental subdivision 
thereof, which law, rule, or regulation pertains to participation in, 
compliance with, implementation of, or the furnishing of information 
regarding restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by 
foreign countries against other countries.) 
32 Barclays Bank PLC. v.  Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).  In Barclays, the Court 
conducted a close examination of a California tax policy that required “worldwide 
combined reporting,” in contrast to the federal government’s “‘separate accounting’ 
method.”  Id. at 307–10.  After examining similar tax cases dealing with whether the federal 
interest in uniformity justified preemption of the state tax, it held that Congressional 
inaction (and the occasional refusal to act) on similar past matters indicated a willingness to 
allow the tax and that its ability to speak in one voice had not been compromised.  Id. at 
324–30.  “[P]recatory” Executive assertions of the interference with foreign relations were 
immaterial because the Constitution gave Congress, and not the Executive, control over 
foreign commerce.  Id. at 330. 
33 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism:  Lessons 
from Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185 (2008); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. 
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between the states and the federal government; in the case of the United 
States, the vertical federalism structure is imposed by the Supremacy 
Clause.34  The foreign affairs area is often cited as the quintessential 
example of and argument for vertical federalism.35  Vertical federalism 
largely concerns itself with uniformity, and the foreign affairs field is no 
exception in that regard.  Preemption, in a vertical federalist analysis, 
enforces the federal determination over specific experiments taken at the 
state level because the field at issue has been entrusted to federal 
safekeeping.  As Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey recently noted: 
When what is at stake is a national, integrated scheme 
for employee benefits, labor law, carrier liability, or 
arbitration, for example, the vertical dimension to the 
federalism interest points to the central role of national 
power in solving the autarchic impulses that doomed 
the Articles of Confederation and prompted the creation 
of the modern federal state.36 
Horizontal federalism, on the other hand, addresses the allocation 
and distribution of authority and power among the several states.37  
Horizontal federalism concerns itself with coordination problems 
between and among states, rather than uniformity concerns.38  The 
poster child for horizontal federalism is environmental law, though 
convincing arguments are made for many other commercial areas of the 
law, such as product liability.  Despite scholars’ branding foreign affairs 
and, more specifically, foreign affairs preemption as vertical federalism 
analyses, horizontal federalism concerns are also often present.  In this 
context, “[p]reemption is a way of arresting [the several states’] perennial 
quest for a free lunch.”39  In other words: 
                                                                                                             
L. REV. 493 (2008); Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism:  An 
Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81 
DENV. U. L. REV. 289 (2003); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor 
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs:  
Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal 
Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007). 
34 Erbsen, supra note 33, at 501. 
35 Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 33, at 1370. 
36 Id. 
37 Erbsen, supra note 33, at 501; Ahdieh, supra note 33, at 1218. 
38 Ahdieh, supra note 33, at 1187–88. 
39 Michael S. Greve, Subprime, but not Half-Bad, AEI FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, Sept. 2003, 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19271/pub_detail.asp. 
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So long as the costs of regulation accrue principally 
within each regulating state, states should generally be 
free to do as they please.  Overregulated citizens and 
businesses tend to leave, and that threat will at some 
point discipline the politicians setting the rules.  In 
contrast, when states impose the costs of their regulatory 
experiments on citizens in other states, the folks who foot 
the bill can neither run away nor vote the bums out of 
office.  For that reason, state politicians are extremely 
creative in exporting the costs of their schemes.40 
While the federal concern for uniformity in matters addressing relations 
with foreign nations will (almost) always be present, such horizontal 
concerns for coordination also frequently occur.  Horizontal federalism 
problems can take several forms relevant to foreign affairs.41  Of primary 
concern are state acts in the foreign affairs realm that create negative 
externalities for other states.  The risk, for example, is that an Illinois law 
sanctioning the Sudan could cause a citizen of New Jersey, to whom the 
legislators of Illinois are neither responsible nor owe any allegiance, to 
have goods seized or to experience other negative treatment by the 
government of Sudan.  Similarly, state laws that favored (or disfavored) 
products from a given foreign state or, for example, required certain 
human rights certifications, might ultimately raise costs for citizens of 
other states, who would have little direct recourse.42  Finally, competition 
among states for foreign investment could raise similar concerns if tax 
breaks or other benefits would prejudice other sister-state interests.43 
This essay argues that courts should evaluate the vertical and 
horizontal federalism concerns that are implicated by the state law in 
question.  In so doing, courts can draw a better picture of the relative 
interests of the state individually, any interested sister state, the 
collective of states generally, and the federal government.  Those 
interests will determine the appropriate approach to adopt in 
considering whether the state law is preempted. 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 Erbsen, supra note 33, at 512–28.  Allan Erbsen’s thorough exegesis of various types of 
horizontal federalism concerns outlines eight separate sources of interstate friction:  
Dominion, Havens, Exclusions, Favoritism, Externalities, Rogues, Competition, and 
Overreaching.  Id. 
42 See id. at 516–20.  These would be examples of “havens” and/or “exclusions” under 
Erbsen’s typology.  Id. 
43 See id.  This is an example of Erbsen’s “competition” friction.  Id. 
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IV.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION ACROSS TWO DIMENSIONS 
This essay proposes a framework for choosing an appropriate 
preemption paradigm.  This framework first separates state actions that 
create foreign affairs problems into three categories.  The following 
sections set out the typology of the three categories and provide 
examples of state actions that would fall into those categories.  The 
framework then assigns the appropriate preemption paradigm to each of 
these categories, addressing the vertical and horizontal federalism 
concerns of each category, as well as the realities of our political and 
legal system. 
A. The Tripartite Typology 
Applying these concepts of horizontal and vertical federalism and 
viewing the tensions created by the relevant state action reveals three 
types of foreign affairs controversies.  The first category includes those 
cases that implicate neither vertical nor horizontal federalism concerns.  
The second consists of state actions that implicate only vertical 
federalism/uniformity concerns, and the third and final category 
contains state actions that raise problems across both federalism 
dimensions.44 
1. Tall and Skinny State Actions:  Neither Vertically nor Horizontally 
Challenged 
State actions fall into this category where the state statute/action 
causes only incidental effects on the conduct of foreign relations and 
raises negligible or positive externality concerns.  Statutes of general 
application applied evenhandedly to a foreign party or interest will often 
fall into this category.  Other examples of the many state actions that 
would fall into this category include:  (1) sister-city arrangements 
(agreements between a municipality in the United States with a 
geographically- and culturally-diverse municipality in order to expand 
on historical or cultural ties, and to create and develop commercial 
relationships);45 (2) trade office and chamber of commerce 
                                                 
44 This essay leaves out the obvious fourth possibility where horizontal concerns are 
implicated, without vertical/uniformity concerns, as food for other work—in the foreign 
affairs preemption world, this option is not relevant. 
45 See Sister Cities International, http://www.sistercities.org/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 
20, 2009) (noting that these arrangements are increasingly common and are the result of a 
program started by President Eisenhower in 1956). 
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arrangements;46 and (3) study abroad and other academic exchanges 
between states, state universities, and foreign parties.47 
One increasingly common example is a bilateral arrangement 
between a state government and a foreign sovereign to promote 
investment in a certain industry between the two constituencies.  
California has entered into several such agreements48 with Israel, with 
the following stated purposes: 
1. To seek enhanced trade relationships and facilitate 
cooperation between companies[;] 2. To encourage 
bilateral investment[;] 3. To support industrial research 
and development between companies, particularly in 
high technology[;] 4. To promote the exchange of ideas 
between various businesses, trade associations, business 
agencies and commercial institutions as well as visits of 
company representatives, engineers, Scientists and other 
specialists[; and] 5. To notify of trade fairs and 
exhibitions, investment seminars and other business 
related conferences.49 
There have also been recent efforts in California to create a bilateral 
agreement/memorandum of understanding in the technology sector.50  
A final example is the municipal adoption of the substantive provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter “CEDAW”).51  Despite 
President Carter’s signature, CEDAW has languished for decades 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., ESD Locations, http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Contacts_and_about_us/ 
locations.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).  New York has offices of the Empire State 
Development Corporation in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, China, Canada, Israel, 
Mexico, and France and has offices with the Council of Great Lake Governors in Brazil, 
Chile, and South Africa.  Id.  See also Enterprise Florida, International Advantages, 
http://www.eflorida.com/ContentSubpage.aspx?id=348 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).  Florida 
has fourteen international offices.  Id. 
47 See, e.g., University International Council, http://www.ohio.edu/uic/agreements. 
cfm.  For example, The Ohio State University has agreements with departments of the 
governments of Swaziland and Malaysia, among others.  Id. 
48 These are generally termed Memoranda of Understanding or Intent, likely designed to 
avoid creating a Constitutional problem under the Compact Clause. 
49 California-Israel Cooperation Agreements, May 27, 1998, available at 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/calmous.html. 
50 See Press Release, California State Assembly Member Bob Blumenfield, California-
Israel Cooperative Agreement on Renewable Energy Approved by Assembly Committee 
(April 29, 2009), available at http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/a40/News_ 
Room/Press/20090429AD40PR01.aspx. 
51 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378. 
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without Senate ratification.  The City of San Francisco, however, adopted 
substantive provisions of CEDAW as a matter of municipal law, 
beginning with a self-study of public departments leading to 
recommendations to the departments on how to best implement 
CEDAW’s principles.52 
2. The Old Suit:  Traditional Foreign Affairs Uniformity Issues 
The second category is that of the classic foreign affairs preemption 
case.  In these situations, the state action creates non-trivial interference 
with the uniform position of the United States (regardless of whether 
that position has been expressed), but there is no concern about inter-
state coordination.  One example of such a state action would be a Buy 
American Statute.53  California’s Buy American Act, for example, 
requires that contracts for public buildings or materials for public use be 
given to persons or companies that agree to use materials manufactured 
in the United States from materials produced in the United States.54  
Missouri similarly limits the purchase of goods and services by public 
agencies and subdivisions to those produced in the United States, subject 
to certain exceptions.55  Many other states have similar restrictions on the 
spending of public funds.56 
These statutes, of course, raise uniformity concerns.  The federal 
government has an interest in uniform standards for the import of and 
trade in foreign goods.  However, there is no significant coordination 
problem; rather, the interests of other states are unlikely to be 
significantly and negatively affected, unless there was evidence that the 
Buy American Statute at issue was intended to affect one specific foreign 
state or was being applied in that manner.  Indeed, generally speaking, 
Buy American Statutes in one state would reduce demand for foreign 
goods and services and render those goods cheaper in other states.  
Thus, under normal circumstances, they would raise only uniformity 
concerns. 
                                                 
52 Resnik, supra note 33, at 58; see S.F. COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, CEDAW 
ACTION PLAN (2003), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/cosw_page.asp?id=17146. 
53 See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913 (3d Cir. 1990); K.S.B. 
Technical Sales Corp. v. N.J. Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774, 782–84 (N.J. 1977); 
N. Am. Salt Co. v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 701 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
54 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 4303 (West 2008). 
55 MO. REV. STAT. § 34.353 (2001). 
56 E.g., MINN. STAT. § 16.073 (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 34.353 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40A:11-18 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:32-1, 52:33-2 (West 2001); N.Y. GEN. MUN. 
LAW § 103 (McKinney Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.09(C) (West 2002); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 61, § 51 (2001). 
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3. Short, Squat State Statutes:  Those That Raise Both Horizontal and 
Vertical Federalism Concerns 
The final category of state actions are those that interfere with the 
federal government’s interest in uniformity vis-à-vis the international 
community and a sister-state’s (or several sister-states’) individualized 
interests.  Generally speaking, these are state statutes that single out a 
foreign government or set of governments for specific negative treatment 
or condemnation.57  Garamendi, Zschernig, and Crosby would all fit into 
this category.58 Taking Crosby as an example, one can see how the 
federalism interests would play out.  The uniformity concerns are, as is 
often the case, straightforward.  The federal government has an interest 
in a singular and integrated approach to Burma, its government, and its 
human rights record.59  The Massachusetts law both affected the efficacy 
of that effort and created the potential for interference with U.S. relations 
with the international community more generally.60  The state law 
interfered with the ability of the federal government to negotiate with 
Burma and to work with the rest of the international community.61  It 
also, however, creates potential negative externalities, which raise 
horizontal federalism concerns.  In passing additional sanctions against 
Burma, Massachusetts created a risk of altering Burmese behavior 
toward residents of any other state.  For example, a traveler from another 
state who happened to be in Burma (perhaps unwisely, given the 
climate) would be potentially subject to reprisals as a result of the 
Massachusetts action and would have had no input in, or recourse 
against, the Massachusetts government that passed the sanctions bill.  
Importantly, this possibility of reprisal would have been present 
regardless of federal action. 
B. The Advantages of the Tripartite Typology 
Classifying state actions in this manner provides a helpful 
framework for analyzing foreign affairs preemption cases for several 
reasons.  First, this typology, by exploring the federalism tensions 
created by the state action, reflects the constitutional allocation of power 
between the federal government and the states, and among the several 
states as well.  Any preemption analysis is, at its heart, a balancing act 
                                                 
57 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 
58 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
59 See Crosby, 530 U.S. 363. 
60 Id. at 381–82. 
61 Id. at 382. 
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and the identification and separation of the distinct federal and state 
interests and effects allows the court to achieve a more desirable and 
stable equilibrium. 
Second, the typology allows courts to more easily identify the 
various interests of the players and separate out the parties who 
represent those interests.  Parsing out protectionism from concerns about 
the United States’ policies on human rights violations in Sudan can help 
a court in considering the level of interference with the federal 
government’s uniformity interest.  Moreover, isolating those ideas from 
the interstate effect, regardless of whether intentional or incidental, 
allows for easier measurement and evaluation. 
Third, the typology and the separation of those interests reflect the 
realities of our federal structure.  Congress and the President excel at 
identifying challenges to the federal government’s interest in unimpeded 
power to communicate, negotiate, and otherwise undertake the foreign 
relations business of the United States as a whole.  They can be 
depended on to remedy incursions into that sphere, challenges along the 
vertical/uniformity axis, as they deem in the best interests of the United 
States. 
Conversely, inter-state coordination issues and externalities or 
disequilibria among the states are less well protected by Congress.  
Indeed, if several states act together in a certain manner to the detriment 
of a single other state, it may be difficult or even impossible for that 
aggrieved state to achieve the consensus necessary for congressional 
action.  The interests of that state, therefore, must be protected in another 
manner.  Finally, because this typology establishes default rules, it serves 
to enhance the predictability and flexibility of the application of foreign 
affairs preemption.  It is predictable because a state seeking to enact a 
law knows whether it may do so by itself, without regard to federal 
action, or whether it must go to Congress first for permission.  The 
ability of Congress to allow states to invade its prerogatives provides the 
flexibility.  Just as the federal government can explicitly preempt certain 
actions that states otherwise would be able to undertake, it can explicitly 
allow others that it deems are worth the problems that they may create. 
C. Applying the Preemption Paradigm 
Preemption is, at its heart, an invasion into the sovereignty of the 
states.  As such, when choosing among the numerous options,62 the 
                                                 
62 There are other preemption paradigms not discussed in this Article.  See generally 
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE:  A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 89–125 (2004) (discussing preemption analysis). 
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proper preemption paradigm affects that sovereignty only so far as 
necessary to protect the offended and constitutionally superior (or at 
least equal) interest.  The less invasive a state action is into other 
sovereigns’ spheres, be they sister-state or federal, the more deferential a 
court should be to that state action.  On the other hand, the farther 
outside its borders and limits a state ventures, the more searching the 
preemption analysis should be.  Armed with the typology created above, 
the preemption paradigms fall naturally into place along their 
continuum of invasiveness, from explicit to dormant preemption, 
thereby respecting as much as possible the balance between federal and 
state interests. 
For the first archetype, where the state statute presents neither 
vertical nor horizontal concerns, it does not, by definition, challenge the 
federal expression of foreign policy nor does it impinge on any other 
state’s interests.  Rather, the state acts, within its authority, as it sees fit to 
maintain public order or serve the public good.  Thus, under these 
circumstances, it is appropriate to require either explicit or conflict 
preemption of state law; that is, the state law is preempted only if the 
federal statute (or treaty) contains explicitly preemptory language or 
compliance with both the federal and state enactments would be 
impossible.63  Direct conflict or explicit preemption is warranted in these 
circumstances because the state’s interest is strongest in laws of general 
application and the state does not directly implicate the federal interest 
in uniformity or the other states’ interests in remaining free from 
interference.  If the peripheral interference with other states or the 
federal government is sufficiently grave, the federal government will, no 
doubt, be able to legislate and explicitly preempt the state statute at 
issue, if the area is within its constitutional powers.64  
In the second category, with vertical but no horizontal federalism 
concerns present, obstacle preemption is the best approach.65  The federal 
government and state governments have largely overlapping authority, 
although these actions directly implicate foreign affairs, as they do not 
threaten the interests of other states.  In these situations, by definition, 
the state action has created a non-trivial interference with the federal 
government’s conduct of foreign relations; thus, any valid federal action, 
by either the executive or legislative branch, should preempt state law.66  
                                                 
63 See supra Part II.C (defining express preemption).  
64 Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (displacing contrary state law due to a 
treaty regarding migratory birds even though Congress’s power to enact similar measures 
in the absence of a treaty was questioned). 
65 See supra Part II.B (discussing foreign affairs examples of obstacle preemption). 
66 This Article does not decide the complicated question of what the appropriate balance 
is between the Executive and Legislative branches in foreign affairs.  There has been 
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Nevertheless, as Congress and the President are well able to protect their 
own power and interests, one can require some action, whether by 
statute or executive order, on their part to establish the general policy of 
the United States.  If the state statute presents an obstacle to the fruition 
of that policy, it must bow before it. 
The final category of state statutes contains those that raise both 
vertical and horizontal federalism concerns.  This is the type of action 
that states can be said to lack the constitutional power to effect.  Not only 
is their interest limited in the international sphere generally, but each 
state holds that limited power equally.  One state should not be allowed 
to impinge upon another state’s authority in this manner.67  Thus, 
dormant foreign affairs preemption is an appropriate way to block this 
type of state action.   
These are cases that single out, in a negative or derogatory manner, a 
particular state or specific group of states.  The federal government has a 
clear interest in uniform relations with given states, just as it does with 
the international community generally.  It is certainly capable of 
protecting that interest by itself, without resorting to dormant 
preemption.  However, where a state denigrates or seeks to punish a 
distinct foreign nation, it exports the burden created to other states as 
well.  Nor is Congress the place to which those other offended states can 
look for recourse; the nature of the republican system is that smaller 
groups can often block the efforts of larger groups of states, to say 
nothing of the case where it is one state that bears the brunt of a larger 
minority. 
It bears noting that there is nothing stopping Congress from 
allowing state actions of the latter two types to persist.  Indeed, recent 
state incursions into the federal foreign affairs sphere regarding the 
Sudan have led to just that.68  Various states passed Crosby-like statutes 
condemning the atrocities committed in Darfur.69  A suit was brought to 
                                                                                                             
extensive debate on this point, all well beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally 
MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 165–91 (1990) (discussing Presidential 
policy and Executive Agreements); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA 
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive 
Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the 
(Non)Treaty Power, 77 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 133 (1998). 
67  See Erbsen, supra note 33. 
68 See Resnik, supra note 33, at 80–81. 
69 See Resnik, supra note 33, at 80–81; SUDAN DIVESTMENT TASK FORCE, THE STATE OF 
SUDAN DIVESTMENT:  AN OVERVIEW OF STATES, CITIES, UNIVERSITIES, COMPANIES, AND 
PRIVATE PENSIONS CURRENTLY WORKING ON SUDAN DIVESTMENT, 
http://www.sudandivestment.org/docs/state_of_sudan_divestment.pdf (presenting a 
snapshot as of August 1, 2008). 
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enjoin the enforcement of the Illinois statute70 and, on the basis of foreign 
affairs preemption, the court granted the injunction.71  Within the year, 
however, Congress passed the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act 
of 2007 (hereinafter “SADA”), which allows states to enact prohibitions 
on debt financing for companies doing business in the Sudan, essentially 
authorizing the states to enact economic sanctions against the Sudan.72  
Thus, the states were able to enact measures that were suspect under our 
conceptions of vertical and horizontal federalism.73  This ability of 
Congress to allow state interference combined with the use of dormant 
preemption, and to a lesser extent obstacle preemption, results in an 
effective switch of the default rules.  Where neither federalism axis is 
challenged, the default is that Congress must act explicitly to preempt 
the state action; where both are implicated, the default is that Congress 
must act explicitly to allow the state action.  This default presumption 
further supports the delicate balance that the framework developed 
above imposes on foreign affairs preemption. 
                                                 
70 The Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan is codified at 15 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 520/22.5 (2008); 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6 (2008) (repealed 2007); 40 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6 (2008). 
71 Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 751 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
72 SADA also eased certain sales restrictions on sales by private pension and mutual 
funds to sell their investments, allowing their compliance with the state statutes as well as 
allowing them to follow any moral compulsion they might feel.  See Sudan Accountability 
and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516 (2007) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 nt).  It also required certifications from companies 
seeking federal government contracts to certify their lack of involvement with the Sudan.  
Id. 
73 While President George W. Bush signed SADA, he did so issuing a signing statement 
in which he stated: 
This Act purports to authorize State and local governments to divest 
from companies doing business in named sectors in Sudan and thus 
risks being interpreted as insulating from Federal oversight State and 
local divestment actions that could interfere with implementation of 
national foreign policy.  However, as the Constitution vests the 
exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations with the Federal 
Government, the executive branch shall construe and enforce this 
legislation in a manner that does not conflict with that authority. 
Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, 43 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. (Dec. 31, 2007).  In other words, the President was retaining the authority 
to unilaterally strike down specific state statutes if he felt they unduly interfered with the 
conduct of foreign affairs.  The constitutionality of signing statements is extremely unclear 
as is the principle that the President could undertake this type of unilateral veto of a state 
statute. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Foreign affairs preemption and the Supreme Court’s application and 
justification thereof have been rightly questioned as lacking any sort of 
rigor or method.  The twin lenses of two-dimensional federalism provide 
a framework that allows the tailoring of the preemption doctrines to the 
specific state action at issue.  Under the framework developed above, 
states know what to expect when passing statutes with the potential to 
impinge upon the foreign affairs powers of the federal government and 
the federal government is aware of when it needs to act to prevent such 
interference and when action by Congress is unnecessary. 
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